



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/807,965	08/31/2001	Toshio Tamura	P20962	6657
7055	7590	04/21/2005	EXAMINER	
GREENBLUM & BERNSTEIN, P.L.C. 1950 ROLAND CLARKE PLACE RESTON, VA 20191			FISCHER, ANDREW J	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3627	
DATE MAILED: 04/21/2005				

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/807,965

Applicant(s)

TAMURA ET AL.

Examiner

Andrew J. Fischer

Art Unit

3627

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 24 February 2005.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-68 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 29-33 and 44-68 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-28 and 34-43 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☒ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☒ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 - ☒ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date 4/7/01.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: _____.

DETAILED ACTION

Restriction

1. Applicants' election with traverse of Group I (claims 1-28 and 34-43) in the reply filed on February 24, 2005 is acknowledged. The traversal is on the ground(s) that "there would not appear to be a 'serious burden' on the Office in examining claims directed to the non-elected inventions"¹ This is not found persuasive because the Examiner finds that because the inventions are patentably distinct, a serious burden exists. The requirement is still deemed proper and is therefore made final.

2. The Examiner notes that Applicants did not argue that the groups of inventions (*i.e.* Groups I-III) are patentably distinct. However, it is the Examiner's position that the groups are patentably distinct. First, for simplicity of argument, assume all claim limitations in Group I (claims 1-28 and 34-43) will be summarized at 'A'. Next, assume that the claims in Groups II and III contains elements that are also found in Group I (*i.e.* elements 'A') in addition to some additional elements (*i.e.* 'B'). Thus, Groups II and III contains elements 'A' and 'B'. Again, it is extremely important to note that Applicants have failed to argue that the groups are patentably distinct. It is the Examiner's factual determination that Group I is patentably distinct from Groups II and III.

3. Therefore, logic dictates that elements 'B' in claim Groups II and II *must* (by definition) contain patentably distinct features. (This must occur since if elements 'B' did not contain patentably distinct features, 'B' would not be patentably distinct from 'A'). Because of the

¹ Applicants' Response Filed February 24, Page 2, lines 2 and 3.

Art Unit: 3627

mandatory electronic searches required for application allowance in class 705,² the Examiner would be *required* to search for patentably distinct features of element 'B' even if Group I (i.e. claim 1) was searched and considered allowed. A text search in prior art documents containing the 'B' elements would be a different field of search. It is this additional search for elements 'B' that is considered a serious burden as defined by MPEP §808.02 (C). Applicants' arguments have therefore been considered but are not persuasive.

4. Claims 29-33 and 44-68 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.142(b), as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Applicants timely traversed the restriction requirement in the reply filed on February 24, 2005.

5. All references in this Office Action to the capitalized versions of "Applicants" refers specifically the Applicants of record. References to lower case versions of "applicant" or "applicants" refers to any or all patent "applicants." Unless expressly noted otherwise, references to "Examiner" in this Office Action refers to the Examiner of record while reference to or use of the lower case version of "examiner" or "examiners" refers to examiner(s) generally.

6. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologizes for these errors.

² See *Notification of Required and Optional Search Criteria for Computer Implemented Business Method Patent Applications in Class 705, and Request for Comments*, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 108, 30167, June 5, 2001.

Claim Objections

7. The claims are objected to because they include reference characters which are not enclosed within parentheses. Reference characters corresponding to elements recited in the detailed description of the drawings and used in conjunction with the recitation of the same element or group of elements in the claims should be enclosed within parentheses so as to avoid confusion with other numbers or characters which may appear in the claims. See MPEP §608.01(m).

Specification

8. The specification is objected to as failing to provide proper antecedent basis for the claimed subject matter. The claims are replete with these errors. See 37 C.F.R. §1.75(d)(1), MPEP §608.01(o), and MPEP §2181. Some examples follow:

- (i) The “means for inputting information on a sales object” as recited in claim 1.
- (ii) The “means for displaying information on the sales object” as recited in claim 1.
- (iii) The “means for selecting a facility or service person” as recited in claim 2.
- (iv) The “means for inputting information on a product” as recited in claim 3.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §101

9. 35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

10. Claims 34-43 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The basis of this rejection is set forth in a two-prong test:

Art Unit: 3627

- (1) The invention must be within the technological arts; and
- (2) The invention must produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.

11. Prong (1) requires the claimed invention to be within the technological arts. See *In re Musgrave*, 431 F.2d 882, 167 USPQ 280, 289-90 (C.C.P.A. 1970); and *In re Johnston*, 502 F.2d 765, 183 USPQ 172, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Mere abstract ideas (*i.e.*, laws of nature, natural phenomena) that do not apply, involve, use, or advance the technological arts fail to promote the “progress of science and the useful arts”³ and are therefore non-statutory subject matter.⁴

12. In other words, if the invention in the body of the claim is not tied to a technological art, environment, or machine, the claim is non-statutory. *Ex parte Bowman*, 61 USPQ2d 1665, 1671 (B.P.A.I. 2001) (Unpublished). See also MPEP §2106 IV B. 2 (b) ii). The Examiner recommends (by way of example only) positive recitation of a computer or other technology within *the body of the claim* if the specification supports such an amendment.

13. Claims 34-38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The limitation of “he may realize his business of introducing products” specifically limits the claim to particular person. A claim directed to or including within its scope a human being or attributes of a human being is not patentable subject matter. See MPEP §2105 and 1077 OG 24 (April 21, 1987).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 2nd Paragraph

14. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:

³ It is the Examiner’s position that “technological arts” is synonymous with “useful arts” as stated in the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §8. See *In re Waldbaum*, 457 F.2d 997, 173 USPQ 430, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1972).

⁴ *E.g.*, the physical sciences are statutory; *c.f.*, social sciences which are non-statutory

Art Unit: 3627

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

15. Claims 1-28 and 34-43 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2nd paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. The claims are replete with errors. Some examples follow.

- a. In claim 1, Applicants have failed to clearly link and associate corresponding structure to the “means for inputting information on a sales object”
- b. Claim 2 and 4-28 are indefinite because it is unclear if the “system in the phrase “The system of claim [x]” (where x refers to the immediate parent claim; e.g. claim 4 states “The system of claim 3”) refers to the “support system” or to the “terminal system” as found in the parent claim respectively.
- c. In claim 3, Applicants have failed to clearly link and associate corresponding structure to the “means for inputting information on a product”
- d. Claims 34-43 are indefinite because the subject matter of the claims can not be reasonably ascertained. If Applicants overcome the §101 rejection with respect to the technological arts, this particular 35 U.S.C. §112, 2nd paragraph rejection will be withdrawn.
- e. In claims 39 and 40 respectively, the phrases “is organized so that” are indefinite. It is unclear if Applicants are reciting structure or something else.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §102

16. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. §102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office Action:

Art Unit: 3627

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States. . . .

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

17. Claims XXX, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Peterson et. al. (U.S. 6,324,522 B2)(“Peterson”). Peterson discloses the claimed invention including a means for inputting information (a keyboard); a means for displaying information (a computer monitor); and an information management system (the CPU).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103

18. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

19. Claims XXX, as understood by the Examiner, are alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Peterson in view of Johnson et. al. (U.S. 6,023,683) (“Johnson”).⁵ It is the Examiner’s principle position that the claims are anticipated because it is

⁵ See MPEP §2112 expressly authorizing alternative §102/§103 rejections when the question of inherency is present in the anticipation rejection.

Art Unit: 3627

inherent that the system is transmitting to the product facility instructions for providing the product.

However if not inherent, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Peterson as taught by Johnson to include transmitting to the product facility instructions for providing the product. Such instructions could include ‘drop shipping’ or providing an address to where the products should be delivered.

20. After careful review of the specification, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicants to be their own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).⁶

In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation . . .” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

⁶ It is the Examiner’s position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

Art Unit: 3627

However, if Applicants disagree with the Examiner and have either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wish to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desire a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly indicate⁷ the claim limitation at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined. Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).⁸ The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

Applicants are reminded that failure by Applicants in their next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicants to forgo lexicography in this application and to

⁷ “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

⁸ See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.⁹

Additionally, it is the Examiner's position that the above requirements are reasonable.¹⁰ Except for the possibility of the application of 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th paragraph, the preceding discussion on lexicography principles (and lack thereof) applies to all examined claims currently pending.

21. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicants' interpretations and except for claim phrases that properly invoke and apply 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th paragraph, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.¹¹ Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.¹² Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

Server: "2. On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a client." Computer Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA,

⁹ See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: "the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability [Emphasis added.]"

¹⁰ The Examiner's requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner's requirements are simply an express request for clarification of how Applicants intend their claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicants is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21st Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm (last accessed April 17, 2005).

¹¹ While most definitions are cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definition(s) to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.

¹² See e.g. *Brookhill-Wilk 1 LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; "resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question").

1997.¹³ **Client**: “3. On a local area network or Internet, a computer that accesses shared network resources provided by another computer (called a server).” **Id.** **Computer**: “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” **Id.**

Data “Plural of the Latin datum, meaning an item of information. In practice, data is often used for the singular as well as plural the form of the noun.” **Id.**

Information “2 a . . . (3): FACTS, DATA” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition, Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield, M.A., 1997.

Customer “One that purchases a commodity or service” **Id.**

Product “2 a : something produced,” **Id.**

22. With respect to claims 1-28 and 34-43, the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants that: “A system is an apparatus.” *Ex parte Fressola* 27 USPQ2d 1608, 1611 (B.P.A.I. 1993)(citations omitted). Additionally, “[c]laims in apparatus form conventionally fall into the 35 U.S.C. §101 statutory category of a ‘machine.’” *Ex parte Donner*, 53 USPQ2d 1699, 1701 (B.P.A.I. 1999)(unpublished), (Paper No. 34, page 5, issued as U.S. Patent 5,999,907).

¹³ Based upon Applicants’ disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See e.g. *Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

Art Unit: 3627

Therefore, it is the Examiner's position that Applicants' system claims are "product," "apparatus," or more specifically, "machine" claims.¹⁴

23. In light of Applicants' choice of "product," "apparatus," or more specifically, "machine" claims, Applicants are reminded that functional recitations using the word "for" only (*i.e.* not "means for"), "adapted to," "so that," or other functional terms (*e.g.* see claim 1 which recites "for supporting sales of sales objects") have been considered but are given little patentable weight¹⁵ because they fail to add any structural limitations and are thereby regarded as intended use language. A recitation of the intended use in a product claim must result in a structural difference between the claimed product and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed product from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it reads on the claimed limitation. *In re Casey*, 370 F.2d 576, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967) ("The manner or method in which such machine is to be utilized is not germane to the issue of patentability of the machine itself."); *In re Otto*, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See also MPEP §§ 2114 and 2115. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the claim interpretation principles in this paragraph apply to all examined claims currently pending.

24. Additionally, the Examiner notes that "the PTO and the CCPA acknowledged product-by-process claims as an exception to the general rule requiring claims to define products in terms of structural characteristics." *Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.*, 970 F.2d 834, 845, 23 USPQ2d 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hereinafter "*Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*").

¹⁴ Products may be either machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. MPEP §2106 IV B. 2 (a).

¹⁵ See *e.g. In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating that although all limitations must be considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight.).

Art Unit: 3627

Furthermore, the Federal Circuit “acknowledges that it has in effect recognized . . . product-by-process claims as exceptional.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*, 970 F.2d at 847, 23 USPQ2d at 1491.

Because of this exceptional status, the Examiner has carefully reviewed the claims and it is the Examiner’s position that claims 1-28 and 34-43 *do not* contain any product-by-process limitations whether in a conventional format or otherwise. If Applicants disagree with the Examiner, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly point out any product-by-process claim(s) and their limitations so that they may be afforded their exceptional status and treated accordingly. Applicants are reminded that “even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself.” *In re Thorpe*, 777 F.2d 695, 697, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).¹⁶ Failure by Applicants in their next response to also address this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered intent by Applicant(s) *not* to recite any product-by-process limitations. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on product-by-process principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

Conclusion

25. References considered pertinent to Applicants’ disclosure are listed on form PTO-892. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, all references listed on form PTO-892 are cited in their entirety.

¹⁶ See also MPEP §2113.

Art Unit: 3627

26. The following two (2) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) apply to this Office Action: MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 200, 500, 600, 700, 1000, 1100, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1700, 1800, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2500, 2600, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8th Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. All remaining MPEP citations are from MPEP 8th Edition, August 2001.

27. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

28. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work 4th Ed. by Ron White; is additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. The reference is cited in its entirety. Moreover, because the reference is directed towards beginners (see *e.g.* “User Level Beginning . . .”), because of the reference’s basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the reference is primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because the reference is directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within the reference.

Art Unit: 3627

29. In accordance with the USPTO's goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. If Applicants disagree with any factual determination or legal conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,¹⁷ the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants to properly traverse the Examiner's position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in their next response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicants agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicants to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicants have any questions regarding the Examiner's positions or have other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicants are strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (571) 272-6779. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Robert Olszewski, can be reached at (571) 272-6788. To respond to this Office Action by facsimile, fax to (703) 872-9306.



Andrew J. Fischer
Patent Examiner
Art Unit 3627

AJF
April 17, 2005

¹⁷ E.g., if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner's implied position that the references are analogous art.